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Abstract
In this paper we develop combinatorial methods for the evaluation of yield and operational
reliability of fault-tolerant systems-on-chip. The method for yield computation assumes that de-
fects are produced according to a model in which defects are lethal and affect given components
of the system following a distribution common to all defects; the method for the computation
of operational reliability also assumes that the fault-tree function of the system is increasing.
The distribution of the number of defects is arbitrary. The methods are based on the formulation
of, respectively, the yield and the operational reliability as the probability that a given boolean
function with multiple-valued variables has value 1. That probability is computed by analyzing
a ROMDD (reduced ordered multiple-value decision diagram) representation of the function.
For efficiency reasons, a coded ROBDD (reduced ordered binary decision diagram) representa-
tion of the function is built first and, then, that coded ROBDD is transformed into the ROMDD
required by the methods. We present numerical experiments showing that the methods are able
to cope with quite large systems in moderate CPU times.
∗This paper is an extended version of D. P. Munteanu, V. Sun˜e´, R. Rodrı´guex-Montan˜e´s, and J. A. Carrasco, “A
Combinatorial Method for the Evaluation of Yield of Fault-Tolerant Systems-on-Chip,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. on
Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN2003), San Francisco, June 2003, pp. 563–572.
1 Introduction
Systems-on-chip are becoming popular. The high densities and areas of those integrated systems
make them very susceptible to manufacturing defects. In fact, complex systems-on-chip are likely
to have a very small yield and may have a small operational reliability if they are not designed
with built-in fault-tolerance. Then, there is a need for efficient methodologies for estimating the
yield and operational reliability of complex fault-tolerant systems-on-chip. When the fault-tolerant
system-on-chip has a regular structure, it is often possible to make “ad-hoc” evaluations (see, for
instance, [12, 13, 18, 19]). However, many fault-tolerant designs do not have a regular structure,
particularly those using a sophisticated network-on-chip as a communication subsystem among the
intellectual property cores (IPs) [4]. Computing the yield and operational reliability of such systems-
on-chip is difficult, mainly because the fact that realistic defect distributions have clustering [8, 14,
15, 16, 17, 19] and, thus, introduce dependencies among the initial failed states of the components of
the system (see, for instance, [19, 28]). Simulation is an approach which is not severely limited by
the complexity of the system, but tends to be expensive and does not provide strict error control. The
aim of this paper is to develop combinatorial methods for the evaluation of the yield and operational
reliability of fault-tolerant systems-on-chip with precise error control which can cope with quite
complex systems using currently affordable computational resources.
We assume that the fault-tolerant system-on-chip is made up of a set {1, 2, . . . , C} of com-
ponents and that whether the system is functioning or not is determined from the failed states of
the components through a fault-tree function F (x1, . . . , xC), where variable xi takes the value 1
if and only if component i is failed and the function takes the value 1 if and only if the system is
not functioning. In the combinatorial method for yield evaluation, no restriction will be imposed on
F (x1, . . . , xC). In the combinatorial method for the evaluation of the operational reliability, it will
be assumed that F () is increasing. It will be assumed that a gate-level description of the function is
available. A way to ensure that F () is increasing is to allow only the use of AND and OR gates in
the gate-level description.
The production of manufacturing defects will be modeled using the following probabilities:
Qk = P [number of manufacturing defects is k], k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
Pi = P [any given defect affects component i and is lethal] ,
where a defect is lethal if it causes the component not to function properly. We emphasize that
it is assumed that all defects will be distributed over the components making up the system and
will be lethal following the probabilities Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ C , independently of the number of defects,
of which components affect the remaining defects and of whether those defects are lethal or not.
That model is useful from the designer’s point of view, since the distribution of the number of
defects Qk, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . could be easily provided by the manufacturer of the system-on-chip and
the probabilities Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ C could be estimated from the final layout of the system-on-chip
using appropriate tools [20, 22, 32, 33] or from IP layouts and routing estimates [31]. Thus, the
methodologies could be used at several design stages. The assumed model is consistent with all
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compound Poisson yield models [19], which include the widely used negative binomial distribution
for the number of defects. The assumed model will not be consistent however with yield models
accounting for spatial clustering1 such as the one proposed in [23].
From a computational point of view, it is convenient to map the previously described model
into a model taking into account only lethal manufacturing defects, i.e. defects which effectively
make some component of the system to be defective (not to work properly). That model includes
the probabilities:
Q′k = P [number of lethal manufacturing defects is k], k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
P ′i = P [any given lethal defect affects component i] .
The reason why the last model is computationally more convenient is basically because, since not
all defects will be lethal, the distribution Q′k, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . will be shifted to lower values of k
in relation to the distribution Qk, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . and, then, if only up to M defects are analyzed
(the computational cost of the methods will increase with M ), higher accuracy will be obtained if
the distribution Q′k, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . is used instead of Qk, k = 0, 1, 2, . . .. The mapping can be
performed using:
Q′k =
∞∑
m=k
Qm
(
m
k
)
P kL(1− PL)
m−k , (1)
P ′i =
Pi
PL
,
where PL =
∑C
i=1 Pi is the probability that any given defect is lethal. As previously commented,
the negative binomial distribution is the most widely used distribution for the number of defects
affecting a chip. That distribution has the form:
Qk =
Γ(α+ k)
k!Γ(α)
(λ/α)k
(1 + λ/α)α+k
, (2)
where λ is the expected number of defects and α is the clustering parameter (the clustering increases
for decreasing α). It is known (see [16]) that, when the distribution of the number of defects is
negative binomial, the distribution of the number of lethal defects is also negative binomial with the
same clustering parameter. More precisely, when the distribution of the number of defects is given
by (2), the distribution of the number of lethal defects is:
Q′k =
Γ(α+ k)
k!Γ(α)
(λ′/α)k
(1 + λ′/α)α+k
,
with λ′ = PLλ. Similar results hold for all compound Poisson distributions [19].
The production of operational faults will be modeled using operational reliability functions
Ri(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ C , where Ri(t) is the probability that, assuming that component i is not affected by
any lethal defect (and, therefore, it is unfailed at time 0), it will not have failed by time t. We allow
1Spatial clustering refers to the fact that irrespectively of the expected number of defects on the system-on-chip, defects
tend to cluster spatially.
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arbitrary decreasing operational reliability functions with Ri(0) = 1. In addition, we will model
coverage failures by introducing coverage parameters Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ C . Upon failure of component
i, the system fails with probability 1 − Ci, irrespectively of the subset of components which were
failed before.
2 Method for Yield Computation
In the method the yield loss, L, is computed analyzing whether the system is initially (right after
manufacturing) functioning or not assuming 0, 1, 2, . . . ,M lethal defects. Let
Lk = P [system is finitially not unctioning | there are k lethal defects] .
We have
L =
∞∑
k=0
Q′kLk .
Analyzing up to M defects we can pessimistically estimate L by
LM =
M∑
k=0
Q′kLk +
∞∑
k=M+1
Q′k
with error bounded from above by
∑∞
k=M+1Q
′
k = 1 −
∑M
k=0Q
′
k. Then, given a suitable error
control parameter ε, we can select
M = min
{
m ≥ 0 : 1−
m∑
k=0
Q′k ≤ ε
}
,
guaranteeing and absolute error in the yield loss estimation ≤ ε.
The yield loss estimate LM can be formalized as the probability that a Boolean function of
certain independent integer-valued random variables is equal to 1. Assume that the defects are
numbered in some arbitrary order. Those random variables are:
W =
{
k, 0 ≤ k ≤M if there are k lethal defects
M + 1 if there are more than M lethal defects
and, for 1 ≤ k ≤M ,
Vk = i if the kth lethal defect affects component i .
Note that the random variable W takes values in {0, 1, . . . ,M + 1} and each random variable Vk
takes values in {1, 2, . . . , C}. The random variable W has probability distribution P [W = k] = Q′k,
0 ≤ k ≤ M , P [W = M + 1] = 1 −
∑M
k=0Q
′
k. The random variables Vk have probability
distributions P [Vk = i] = P ′i , 1 ≤ k ≤M , 1 ≤ i ≤ C .
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Let Ik(x) denote the boolean function with integer-valued variable x returning the value 1 if
x = k and the value 0 otherwise and let I≥l(x) denote the boolean function with integer-valued
variable x returning the value 1 if x ≥ l and the value 0 otherwise. Let the boolean function
G(w, v1, . . . , vM ) = IM+1(w) ∨ F
(
M∨
l=1
I≥l(w) ∧ I1(vl), . . . ,
M∨
l=1
I≥l(w) ∧ IC(vl)
)
. (3)
Then, we have the following result.
Theorem 1. LM = P [G(W,V1, V2, . . . , VM ) = 1].
Intuitively, the reason why Theorem 1 holds is that IM+1(W ) “tells” whether the number of
lethal defects is > M , I≥l(W ) “tells” whether there is a lth lethal defect, Ii(Vl) “tells” whether the
lth lethal defect affects component i and, then,
∨M
l=1 I≥l(W ) ∧ Ii(Vl) “tells” whether component i
is affected by some of the first M lethal defects. A formal proof follows.
Proof of Theorem 1 The quantity Lk is the probability that given there are k lethal defects the
system is not functioning. Since, assuming there are k lethal defects, component i is failed if and
only if
∨k
l=1 Ii(Vl) = 1, we have
Lk = P
[
F
(
k∨
l=1
I1(Vl), . . . ,
k∨
l=1
IC(Vl)
)
= 1
]
. (4)
Using the theorem of total probability and the independence of the random variables W,V1, . . . , VM :
P [G(W,V1, . . . , VM ) = 1] =
M+1∑
k=0
P [W = k]P [G(W,V1, . . . , VM ) = 1 |W = k]
=
M∑
k=0
Q′kP [G(k, V1, . . . , VM ) = 1]
+
(
1−
M∑
k=0
Q′k
)
P [G(M + 1, V1, . . . , VM ) = 1] . (5)
But, from the definition of G (3), for 0 ≤ k ≤M :
G(k, v1, . . . , vM ) = F
(
k∨
l=1
I1(vl), . . . ,
k∨
l=1
IC(vl)
)
(6)
and
G(M + 1, v1, . . . , vM ) = 1 . (7)
Then, using (4)–(7)
P [G(W,V1, . . . , VM ) = 1] =
M∑
k=0
Q′kLk +
∞∑
k=M+1
Q′k = L
M .
In the method, the probability P [G(W,V1, . . . , VM ) = 1] is computed building an ROMDD
(reduced ordered multiple-valued decision diagram) of the function G(w, v1, . . . , vM ). ROMDDs
4
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .
. . .
... ...1 2 C1 2
M + 1
vM
C
w
≥ 1 ≥M
w
x1
x2
xC
GF
v1
Figure 1: Gate-level description of the function G(w, v1, . . . , vM ).
are a natural extension of the well-known ROBDDs (reduced ordered binary decision diagrams)
[6] in which both the variables and the function are allowed to be multiple-valued. A gate-level
representation of the function G(w, v1, . . . , vM ) can be obtained from a gate-level representation of
F (x1, . . . , xC) as shown in Fig. 1, where the gate labeled i inside is a “filter” gate returning the value
1 if its integer-valued input has value i and returning the value 0 otherwise and the gate labeled ≥ i
inside is a “filter” gate returning the value 1 if its integer-valued input has value ≥ i and returning
the value 0 otherwise. As ROBDDs, ROMDDs are canonical representations which can be built
and manipulated in a similar way as ROBDDs can. A ROMDD representing a function H , which
can take values in the set SH , of variables xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, which can take values in the sets Si
is a directed acyclic graph with up to |SH | terminal nodes each labeled with a distinct value of the
set SH . Every non-terminal node is labeled by an input variable xi and has as many as |Si| edges,
each labeled by a subset of Si, with subsets associated with different edges being non-intersecting.
The ROMDD has a unique non-terminal node without incoming edges, representing the function
H(x1, . . . , xn), called the top node. The input variables encountered in every path from the top
node to a terminal node form a sequence of non-repeating input variables consistent with an ordering
xp(1), . . . , xp(n) of the input variables of the function. Every non-terminal node of the ROMDD
represents a unique function of the set of input variables not before the input variable associated
with the node in the ordering xp(1), . . . , xp(n). That a ROMDD is a canonical representation means
that, given H , the ROMDD only depends on the selected ordering xp(1), . . . , xp(n) for the multiple-
valued variables.
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Figure 2: Small ROMDD to illustrate the computation of P [G(W,V1, . . . , VM ) = 1].
Using the fact that the random variables W,V1, . . . , VM are independent and that the function
represented by a non-terminal node only depends on the set of variables not before the variable as-
sociated with the node in the considered ordering for the inpute variables, it is possible to compute
P [G(W,V1, . . . , VM ) = 1] from an ROMDD representation of the function G(w, v1, . . . , vM ). This
can be achieved by assigning the value 1 to the terminal node labeled “1” and the value 0 to the ter-
minal node labeled “0”, making a depth-first, left-most traversal [1] of the ROMDD, and computing
the probability that the function represented by a non-terminal node has value 1 when returning from
each non-terminal node. Assume that node n has associated with it the variable w, that M = 4, and
that n has edges to nodes n1, n2 and n3 with subsets of values of w {0, 1}, {3} and {2, 4, 5}, re-
spectively. Then, denoting by value(x) the “value” variable associated with node x, when returning
from node n, value(n) would be computed as (P [W = 0] + P [W = 1]) × value(n1) + P [W =
3]× value(n2) + (P [W = 2] + P [W = 4] + P [W = 5])× value(n3). At the end of the traversal,
the “value” variable of the top node will hold P [G(W,V1, . . . , VM ) = 1]. We illustrate the com-
putational procedure with the small ROMDD shown in Fig. 2 which corresponds to a fault-tolerant
system having fault-tree function F (x1, x2, x3) = x1x2 + x3 and M = 2 under the multiple-valued
variable ordering v1, v2, w. This implies that the random variable W will take values in the set
{0, 1, 2, 3} and the random variables V1 and V2 will take values in the set {1, 2, 3}. Using a depth-
first, left-most traversal of the ROMDD, P [G(W,V1, V2) = 1] = value(n1) would be computed
following the sequence:
value(n4) = Q
′
3 ,
value(n5) = Q
′
2 +Q
′
3 ,
value(n2) = P
′
1 × value(n4) + (P
′
2 + P
′
3)× value(n5) ,
value(n3) = P
′
2 × value(n4) + (P
′
1 + P
′
3)× value(n5) ,
value(n6) = Q
′
1 +Q
′
2 +Q
′
3 ,
P [G(W,V1, V2) = 1] = value(n1) = P
′
1 × value(n2) + P
′
2 × value(n3) + P
′
3 × value(n6) .
Although there are algorithms and packages for ROMDD manipulation [24, 30], there
is currently consensus in the ROMDD community that the most efficient way for analyzing
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multiple-valued functions of multiple-valued variables is by using coded ROBDDs [24, 25].
A coded ROBDD of a multiple-valued function H(x1, x2, . . . , xn) of multiple-valued variables
xi is the ROBDD of any function H ′(x1,1, . . . , x1,k1 , x2,1, . . . , x2,k2 , . . . , xn,1, . . . , xn,kn) which
represents H(x1, x2, . . . , xn) in terms of groups xi,1, xi,2, . . . , xi,ki of binary variables encod-
ing the multiple-valued variables xi. Formally, denoting by Si the domain of xi and by
xi,1(j), . . . , xi,ki(j) the codeword representing value j ∈ Si in the code used for xi, H ′ has to satisfy
H ′(x1,1(j1), . . . , x1,k1(j1), x2,1(j2), . . . , x2,k2(j2), . . . , xn,1(jn), . . . , xn,kn(jn)) = H(j1, . . . , jn)
for every (j1, . . . , jn) ∈ S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn.
Coded ROBDDs can be used directly in many applications such as formal verification. How-
ever, the combinatorial method for yield computation requires the availability of the ROMDD.
Assume that the function represented by the coded ROBSS is Boolean. Given an ordering
xp(1), . . . , xp(n) of the multiple-valued variables, the ROMDD can be efficiently obtained from a
coded ROBDD if the coded ROBDD is obtained using an ordering for the binary variables in which
the variables encoding each multiple-valued variable are kept grouped and the groups are ordered
according to the ordering xp(1), . . . , xp(n). The conversion procedure is based on viewing the coded
ROMDD as made up of non-terminal layers and a terminal layer, where each non-terminal layer
contains the nodes with binary variables encoding a given multiple-valued variable. The terminal
layer includes the terminal node b0 with value 0 and the terminal node b1 with value 1. Some of
the nodes in each layer are entry nodes (they have incoming arcs from other layers). The procedure
builds incrementally the ROMDD by processing bottom-up each layer of the coded ROBDD. Pro-
cessed entry nodes of the coded ROBDD are associated with nodes of the constructed ROMDD. Let
mapping(n) be the node of the ROMDD associated with the entry node n of the coded ROBDD.
The bottom (terminal) layer of the coded ROBDD is processed by creating a copy b′0 in the ROMDD
of the terminal node b0 of the coded ROBDD and creating a copy b′1 in the ROMDD of the terminal
node b1 and making mapping(b0) = b′0 and mapping(b1) = b′1. The remaining layers of the coded
ROBDD are processed by processing each entry node n of the layer as follows. For each possible
value i of the multiple-valued variable x associated with the layer, it is determined which entry node
of a different (down) layer is reached from n when the values of the group of binary variables as-
sociated with the layer encoding value i are followed. Let ns(i) be the node of the coded ROBDD
reached when the value i is “simulated”. If all mapping(ns(i)) are equal to some node n′ of the
ROMDD, then mapping(n) must be made equal to n′ and no node has to be added to the ROMDD.
Otherwise, the ROMDD must have a node associated with n with multiple-valued variable x. That
node must have successor mapping(ns(i)) for each value i of x. If there exists in the ROMDD some
node n′ with multiple-valued variable x and successor mapping(ns(i)) for each value i of x, then,
mapping(n) is set to n′ and no node is added to the ROMDD. Otherwise, a node n′ with multiple-
valued variable x and successor mapping(ns(i)) for each value i of x is added to the ROMDD and
mapping(n) is set to n′. When not all combinations of values of the groups of binary variables en-
code values in the domain of the associated multiple-valued variable, the ROMDD built in that way
may have nodes which are unreachable from the top node. Such nodes are identified and deleted by
making a depth-first, left-most traversal of the ROMDD starting from the top node. Fig. 3 illustrates
the processing of a layer of a coded ROBDD associated with a multiple-valued variable x which
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Figure 3: Illustration of the procedure for obtaining the ROMDD from the coded ROBDD
takes values in the domain {1, 2, 3} and in which two binary variables x1, x0 have been used to
encode variable x using the code 1 = 00, 2 = 01 and 3 = 10.
The coded ROBDD used in the method for yield computation is built by processing an im-
plementation of the function G(w, v1, . . . , vM ) in binary logic obtained by encoding the variable
w in binary using a minimum number of bits. For the variables vi, since they have values in the
domain {1, 2, . . . , C}, a binary code of minimum number of bits encoding vi − 1 is used. Such
strategy keeps minimum the number of binary variables and tends to result in coded ROBDDs of
minimum size. Filter gates are substituted by binary logic expressed in terms of the binary variables
wl′ , . . . w0 encoding the multiple-valued variable w and the binary variables vli . . . v0i encoding each
multiple-valued variable vi. Although, with given orderings of the variables, the coded ROBDD and
the ROMDD will be independent on the particular implementation of that logic, that implementation
may affect the heuristic-based orderings. This makes convenient to report which logic is used. Call-
ing zk, 1 ≤ k ≤M , the output of the “filter” gate labeled ≥ k having as input w, and calling zM+1
the output of the “filter” gate labeled M + 1 having as input w, the binary logic used for generating
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zk, 1 ≤ k ≤M + 1 is
zM+1 = lit(wl′ ,M + 1) ∧ lit(wl′−1,M + 1) ∧ · · · ∧ lit(w0,M + 1) ,
zk = zk+1 ∨ lit(wl′ , k) ∧ lit(wl′−1, k) ∧ · · · ∧ lit(w0, k) , 1 ≤ k ≤M ,
where lit(wi,m) = wi if the ith bit of the binary code representing m is 1 and lit(wi,m) = wi if it
is 0, where x denotes the complement of the binary variable x. Calling zki the output of the “filter”
gate labeled k having as input vi, the binary logic used for generating zki is
zki = lit(v
l
i, k − 1) ∧ lit(v
l−1
i , k − 1) ∧ · · · ∧ lit(v
0
i , k − 1) ,
where lit(vji ,m) = v
j
i if the jth bit of the binary code representing m is 1 and lit(v
j
i ,m) = v
j
i if it
is 0. For building the coded ROBDD our implementation of the method uses the well-known BDD
Library developed at Carnegie-Mellon University [3].
It is well-known that the size of the ROBDD of a Boolean function of binary variables depends
on the ordering of the binary variables. Similarly, the size of the ROMDD of a multiple-valued
function of multiple-valued variables depends on the ordering of the multiple-valued variables. The
variables are most often sorted using heuristics and an abundant literature is available about heuris-
tics for ordering the variables of Boolean functions of binary variables using gate-level representa-
tions of the functions [5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 21, 26, 27]. Those heuristics can be classified into static and
dynamic depending on whether the ordering is computed before the ROBDD is built or the ordering
may be changed during the ROBDD construction. Three heuristics which are relatively simple to
implement and which have good performance are the topology heuristic described in [27], the weight
heuristic described in [26] and the H4 heuristic described in [5].
3 Method for Computation of the Operational Reliability
3.1 Perfect coverages
We will find convenient to compute the operational unreliability ur(t) instead of the operational
reliability. The operational unreliability ur(t) is formally defined as the probability that the system
has been failed at some time τ ∈ [0, t]. Since F (x1, . . . , xn) is assumed to be increasing, the system
will be failed at time t if and only if the system has been failed at some time τ ∈ [0, t] and, then,
ur(t) is simply the probability that the system is failed at time t. Let
urk(t) = P [system is failed at time t | there are k lethal defects] .
We have
ur(t) =
∞∑
k=0
Q′kurk(t) .
Analyzing up to M defects we can pessimistically estimate ur(t) by
urM (t) =
M∑
k=0
Q′kurk(t) +
∞∑
k=M+1
Q′k
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with error bounded from above by
∑∞
k=M+1Q
′
k = 1 −
∑M
k=0Q
′
k. Then, given a suitable error
control parameter ε, we can select
M = min
{
m ≥ 0 : 1−
m∑
k=0
Q′k ≤ ε
}
, (8)
guaranteeing and absolute error in the unreliability estimation ≤ ε.
In this section we will describe the method for the particular case Ci = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ C , i.e. when
all components have perfect fault coverage. The more general case 0 ≤ Ci ≤ 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ C will be
dealt with in Section 3.2.
The unreliability estimate urM (t) can be formalized as the probability that a boolean function
of certain independent integer-valued variables is equal to 1. The function is
G(w, v1, . . . , vM , u1, . . . , uC) = IM+1(w)
∨ F
(
u1 ∨
M∑
l=1
I≥l(w) ∧ I1(vl), . . . , uC ∨
M∑
l=1
I≥l(w) ∧ IC(vl)
)
. (9)
Then, with the random variables W and Vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ M defined in Section 2 and the random
variables Ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ C taking values in {0, 1} with probability distributions P [Ui = 0] = Ri(t)
and P [Ui = 1] = 1−Ri(t), we have the following result.
Theorem 2. urM (t) = P [G(W,V1, V2, . . . , VM , U1, U2, . . . , UC) = 1].
Intuitively, the reason why Theorem 2 holds is that IM+1(W ) “tells” whether the number of
lethal defects is > M , I≥l(W ) “tells” whether there is a lth lethal defect, Ii(Vl) “tells” whether
the lth lethal defect affects component i, then,
∨M
l=1 I≥l(W ) ∧ Ii(Vl) “tells” whether component
i is affected by some of the first M lethal defects, and, then, since Ui “tells” whether, assuming
component i is initially unfailed, component i has failed by time t, Ui ∨
∨M
l=1 I≥l(W ) ∧ Ii(Vl)
“tells” whether at time t component i is failed. A formal proof can be developed using the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. urk(t) = P [F (U1 ∨
∨k
l=1 I1(Vl), U2 ∨
∨k
l=1 I2(Vl), . . . , UC ∨
∨k
l=1 IC(Vl)) = 1].
Proof. Consider a system S′ differing from the true system S only in that each component i of S
has been replaced by two components i′, i′′. Component i′ has the initial state of component i and
does not fail with time. Component i′′ is initially unfailed and has reliability Ri(t). Components
i′′ behave independently among them and independently of components i′. The fault-tree function
of system S′ is F ′(x′1, . . . , x′C , x′′1 , . . . , x′′C) = F (x′1 ∨ x′′1, . . . , x′C ∨ x′′C), where x′i is equal to 1
if and only if component i′ is failed and x′′i is equal to 1 if and only if component i′′ is failed.
By construction, the reliabilities of S′ and S are identical. Then, urk(t) is the unreliability of S′
conditioned to the set of components {1′, . . . , C ′} being affected by exactly k lethal defects. But,
given there are k lethal defects, component i′ is affected by some of them if and only if
∨k
l=1 Ii(Vl) =
1 and the result follows.
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Proof of Theorem 2 Using the theorem of total probability and the independence of the random
variables W,V1, . . . , VM , U1, . . . , UC :
P [G(W,V1, . . . , VM , U1, . . . , UC) = 1]
=
M+1∑
k=0
P [W = k]P [G(W,V1, . . . , VM , U1, . . . , UC) = 1 |W = k]
=
M+1∑
k=0
P [W = k]P [G(k, V1, . . . , VM , U1, . . . , UC) = 1] .
But, from the definition of G (9), for 0 ≤ k ≤M :
G(k, v1, . . . , vM , u1, . . . , uC) = F
(
u1 ∨
k∨
l=1
I1(vl), . . . , uC ∨
k∨
l=1
IC(vl)
)
and
G(M + 1, v1, . . . , vM , u1, . . . , uC) = 1 .
Using, then, Proposition 1:
P [G(W,V1, . . . , VM , U1, . . . , UC) = 1]
=
M∑
k=0
P [W = k]urk(t) + P [W = M + 1] =
M∑
k=0
Q′kurk(t) +
∞∑
k=M+1
Q′k = ur
M (t) .
The probability P [G(W,V1, . . . , VM , U1, . . . , UC) = 1] can be computed from a ROMDD
of the function G(w, v1, . . . , vM , u1, . . . , uC) in a similar way as P [G(W,V1, . . . , VM ) = 1] is
computed from a ROMDD of the function G(w, v1, . . . , vM ) in the combinatorial method for eval-
uation of yield. Such a ROMDD can be obtained from the gate-level description of the function
G(w, v1, . . . , vM , u1, . . . , uC) shown in Fig. 4 in terms of the available gate-level description of the
function F (x1, . . . , xC). As in the combinatorial method for evaluation of yield, we obtain first
a coded ROBDD, using the same codes for the multiple-valued variables w, v1, . . . , vM and the
same binary logic for implementing the filter gates as in that method and, then, obtain the ROMDD.
Our implementation of the method for the computation of operational reliability also uses the BDD
Library [3] for building the coded ROBDD.
3.2 Extension to take into account imperfect coverages
The method for evaluation of reliability can be easily extended to take into account imperfect com-
ponent coverages to operational faults using the SEA approach [2]. Using that approach, the unreli-
ability ur(t) for the system S′ introduced in the proof of Proposition 1 with coverage faults (equal
to the reliability of the true system S) can be formalized in terms of the unreliability, ur∗(t) of a
fictitious system, S′∗, differing from S′ only in that the reliabilities of the components subject to
coverage faults (components i′′, 1 ≤ i ≤ C) have values
R∗i (t) =
Ri(t)
Ri(t) + Ci(1−Ri(t))
(10)
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Figure 4: Gate-level description of the function G(w, v1, . . . , vM , u1, . . . , uC).
as
ur(t) = 1− PU (1− ur
∗(t)) ,
with
PU =
C∏
i=1
(1− (1− Ci)(1 −Ri(t))) . (11)
If the combinatorial method is applied to the system S∗ differing from S only in that the operational
reliabilities of the components are R∗i (t) and an approximation ur∗M (t) for the unreliability ur∗(t)
of S∗ is obtained with M selected using (8), it will hold ur∗M (t) − ur∗(t) ≤ ε and, if ur(t) is
estimated by
urM (t) = 1− PU (1− ur
∗M (t)) , (12)
it will hold
urM (t)− ur(t) = PU (1− ur
∗(t))− PU (1− ur
∗M (t)) = PUur
∗M (t)− PUur
∗(t) ≤ PUε ≤ ε .
Then, M can be selected using (8), the pessimistic unreliability approximation ur∗M (t) can be
computed using the combinatorial method with the operational reliabilities R∗i (t) given by (10)
instead of Ri(t), and using (12) with PU given by (11) a pessimistic approximation urM (t) for
ur(t) will be obtained with error bounded from above by ε.
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Figure 5: Architecture of system-on-chip MSn.
4 Benchmarks description
In this section we describe the benchmarks which will be used to evaluate the performance of the
combinatorial methods. The benchmarks are two scalable examples which instantiate systems-on-
chip of increasing numbers of components. The first scalable example, called MSn, is the system-
on-chip with the architecture illustrated in Fig. 5. The system includes a cluster of two “master”
Intellectual Property cores IPM and n clusters including two “slave” Intellectual Property cores IPS.
Those Intellectual Property cores are interconnected using communication modules CM and CS and
two buses. Buses are assumed to be not affected by manufacturing defects. This implies that the
system can be conceptualized as made up of only IPMs, IPSs and communication modules. The
system is operational if at least an unfailed IPM can communicate with at least an unfailed IPS of
each cluster using unfailed communication modules. The communication between the IPM and each
IPS has to be direct, i.e. it can only involve a bus and two communication modules. The numbetr of
manufacturing defects is assumed to have a negative binomial distribution with clustering parameter
α = 3; for the expected number of defects two values will be considered: λ = 2 and λ = 4.
Furthermore, the probabilities Pi will be taken so that PL =
∑C
i=1 Pi = 0.5 (and, then, λ′ will
take the values 1 and 2) and, calling, PIPM the Pi probability of an IPM, PIPS the Pi probability
of an IPS, and PC the Pi probability of a communication module, the following relationships are
satisfied: PIPS/PIPM = 0.5, PC/PIPM = 0.1. The two values for λ are intended to reflect scenarios
in which the fault-tolerant system-on-chip is affected by defects with moderate and high severity.
The required value of M and, thus, the computational cost of the method increases with λ. The
performance of the method for the evaluation of the operational reliability is independent on the
component reliability functions Ri(t) and the values of the coverages Ci. Thus, we will not specify
particular values for those functions and parameters.
The second scalable example is the system-on-chip ESEN n×mwith the architecture described
in Fig. 6 for the case n = 8, m = 2. The system includes (n×m)/2 Intellectual Property cores IPA
and (n ×m)/2 Intellectual Property cores IPB interconnected by a ESEN multiexchange intercon-
nection network with n inputs [29], through m× 1 concentrators (C) in case m > 1, in which each
switching element (SE) of the first and last stage have a redundant copy. The system is operational
if (n × m)/2 − 1 unfailed IPAs and (n × m)/2 − 1 unfailed IPBs can communicate through the
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Figure 6: Architecture of system-on-chip ESEN8x2.
interconnection network. It is assumed that links are not affected by manufacturing defects. Thus,
the system can be conceptualized as made up of only IPAs, IPBs, SEs and, in case m > 1, Cs. As
in the first scalable example, the number of manufacturing defects is assumed to have a negative
binomial distribution with clustering parameter α = 3 and for the expected number of defects two
values will be considered: λ = 2 and λ = 4. Furthermore, the probabilities Pi will be taken so
that PL =
∑C
i=1 Pi = 0.5 (and, then, λ′ will take the values 1 and 2) and, calling, PIPA the Pi
probability of an IPA, PIPB the Pi probability of an IPB, PSE the Pi probability of a SE, and PC the
Pi probability of a C, the following relationships are satisfied: PIPB/PIPA = 0.5, PSE/PIPA = 0.05
and PC/PIPA = 0.02.
Table 1 gives the number of components C of the benchmarks which will be used to evaluate
the performance of the combinatorial methods and the number of gates of the gate-level descriptions
of the corresponding fault-tree functions used in the experiments. That information will allow to
asses the complexity (number of components) of the systems which the methods can handle.
5 Results
All experiments reported in this section were performed in a workstation with a Sun-Blade-
1000 processor and 4 GB of memory. The size of the ROMDD is affected by the order-
ing of the multiple-values input variables (w, v1, . . . , vM in the method for yield evaluation and
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Table 1: Number of components (C) of the benchmarks and number of gates of the gate-level descriptions
of the corresponding fault-tree functions.
benchmark C gates
MS2 18 27
MS4 30 51
MS6 42 75
MS8 54 99
MS10 66 123
ESEN4x1 14 13
ESEN4x2 26 26
ESEN4x4 34 74
ESEN8x1 32 73
ESEN8x2 56 122
w, v1, . . . , vM , u1, . . . , uC in the method for the evaluation of operational reliability). For the
method for yield evaluation we experimented with several orderings: (1) w, v1, . . . , vM , (2)
w, vM , . . . , v1, (3) v1, . . . , vM , w, (4) vM , . . . , v1, w, (5) ordering which results when the heuris-
tic topology is applied to the gate-level description of G(w, v1, . . . , vM ) in binary logic and the
multiple-valued variables are sorted in increasing oeder of the average indices over the groups of
binary variables encoding the multiple-valued variables, (6) idem but using the weight heuristic, and
(7) idem but using the H4 heuristic. We found that the ordering based on the weight heuristic gave
the best results. The size of the coded ROBDD is also affected by the ordering of the group of
binary variables encoding each multiple-valued variable. The ordering most to least significant bit
gave consistently best results. Similar experiments for the method for the evaluation of operational
reliability showed the same orderings to be the best ones. We will assess the computational cost of
both methods using those best orderings.
We analyze first the performance of the method for yield computation. Table 2 gives, for
the benchmarks in which the method succeeded, the CPU times, peak number of ROBDD nodes
(maximum sum of the nodes of the ROBDDs which had to be held simultaneously in memory when
processing the generalized fault-tree), size of the coded ROBDD, size of the ROMDD, and computed
yield loss when the method was run with an error requirement ε = 2 × 10−3. Several comments
are in order. First, CPU times are reasonable in all cases, since in the worst case (ESEN8x2, λ = 2)
the CPU time is about 18 minutes. Second, the peak number of ROBDD nodes can be or not much
larger than the size of the final coded ROBDD. In practice, the application of the method is limited
by that peak, since it is that peak which determines the peak memory consumption of the method.
Third, the size (number of nodes) of the coded ROBDD is about 10 times the size of the ROMDD.
With that factor, even an efficient implementation of ROMDDs is likely to consume more memory
than the coded ROBDD, which has a much simpler structure. Thus, the approach of working with
coded ROBDDs and translate the final coded ROBDD to the ROMDD required to perform the yield
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Table 2: Performance of the method for the evaluation of yield for ε = 2× 10−3.
benchmark CPU time (s) ROBDD peak ROBDD ROMDD LM
MS2, λ = 2 0.98 30,987 24,237 2,034 0.056
MS4, λ = 2 6.23 427,130 243,154 22,760 0.035
MS6, λ = 2 66.4 2,564,600 1,120,255 103,228 0.025
MS8, λ = 2 262 7,518,549 3,154,056 309,136 0.020
MS10, λ = 2 862 20,344,432 7,954,261 731,748 0.016
MS2, λ = 4 3.59 124,067 116,960 7534 0.170
MS4, λ = 4 828 14,175,238 11,885,214 635,530 0.115
ESEN4x1, λ = 2 0.86 37,231 19,338 3046 0.090
ESEN4x2, λ = 2 2.72 200,272 54,705 6995 0.152
ESEN4x4, λ = 2 14.6 368,815 184,332 19,547 0.171
ESEN8x1, λ = 2 173 6,544,206 904,777 134,512 0.119
ESEN8x2, λ = 2 1061 29,926,091 2,244,340 303,657 0.165
ESEN4x1, λ = 4 3.47 143,633 105,511 11,666 0.244
ESEN4x2, λ = 4 18.3 757,529 378,686 30,783 0.368
ESEN4x4, λ = 4 109 3,027,309 1,513,441 96,231 0.395
computations seems to be a good approach. This is consistent with the conclusion reached by
researchers in the ROMDD community that coded ROBDDs is probably the most efficient way of
handling ROMDDs [24, 25]. Putting all results together, it seems that the method can efficiently
compute the yield of systems with up to about 60 components when the average number of lethal
defects is moderate (λ = 2) and up to about 30 components when the average number of lethal
defects is large (λ = 4). The number of components which the method can handle depends, of
course, on the value of the truncation parameter M . That parameter had value 6 for the examples
with λ = 2 and value 10 for the examples with λ = 4.
We analyze next the performance of the method for the evaluation of operational reliability.
Table 3 gives, for the benchmarks in which the method succeeded, the CPU times, peak number
of ROBDD nodes, size of the coded ROBDD, and size of the ROMDD for an error requirement
ε = 10−4. As for the method for yield evaluation, CPU times are reasonable in all cases. The
method seems to be able to handle efficiently systems with up to about 30 components.
6 Conclusions
Systems-on-chip have reached a complexity degree that make them very susceptible to both manu-
facturing defects and operational faults so that reasonable yields and operational reliabilities can only
be achieved with the use of fault-tolerance techniques. That application of fault-tolerance calls for
16
Table 3: Performance of the method for the evaluation of operational reliability for ε = 1× 10−4.
benchmark CPU time (s) ROBDD peak ROBDD ROMDD
MS2, λ = 2 3.83 139,713 136,108 11,895
MS4, λ = 2 3031 19,467,751 18,269,514 1,420,505
MS2, λ = 4 7.8 257,644 254,006 18,785
ESEN4x1, λ = 2 3.14 141,604 107,612 12,646
ESEN4x2, λ = 2 19.7 1,037,767 434,943 87,409
ESEN4x4, λ = 2 113 3,846,387 1,735,787 325,387
ESEN4x1, λ = 4 6.51 277,375 221,660 23,586
ESEN4x2, λ = 4 44.1 1,690,942 876,401 117,789
ESEN4x4, λ = 4 249 6,920,780 3,584,315 423,807
efficient methodologies for evaluation of yield and operational reliability of fault-tolerant systems-
on-chip. Such evaluation is difficult because realistic models for manufacturing defects production
have clustering and, thus, introduce dependencies among the failed states of the components mak-
ing up the system. In this paper, we have developed combinatorial methods for the evaluation of
yield and operational reliability of fault-tolerant systems-on-chip supporting realistic models with
clustering for manufacturing defects. The methods build a ROMDD of a Boolean function with
multiple-valued variables which allows to compute with a predefined accuracy the yield or the oper-
ational reliability. The ROMDD is built automatically from a gate-level description of the fault-tree
specifying the structure function of the system. The computational complexity of the methods in-
creases with the expected number of lethal defects in the fault-tolerant system. We have shown,
however, that the methods are able to deal, using currently affordable computational resources, with
systems having tens of components.
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